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This paper is devoted to the discussion and critical analysis of the various uses of the term of 
legal culture in recent comparative legal studies. It submits that the application of the concept 
of legal culture has had no consensually shared approach in comparative law but numerous 
different ways exist. The main approaches of legal culture in comparative studies have been 
the use of this concept as (i.) background, (ii.) interactions around law, and (iii.) a sum of 
attitudes towards law. In addition, the use of this term is even more complicated as certain 
typical inconsistencies may also be identified. Examples show that (i.) the confusion of 
different understandings of legal culture in the same study, and both (ii.) the under-
theorization and (iii.) over-theorization of legal culture can be regarded as such typical 
inconsistencies. In conclusion, the paper calls attention to a more restricted, self-reflective 
and critical application of this term as the prerequisite of an efficient scholarly use. 
 
I. Introductory remarks 
 
This paper is dedicated to a methodological controversy seemingly characterizing recent 
comparative law scholarship.
1
 The core of this controversy is the application of legal culture 
in comparative legal studies that has certainly been becoming a more and more fashionable 
way of carrying out comparative legal research projects in the last twenty years.
2
 At the first 
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 Here, as a preliminary point, a methodological remark has to be made. This paper relies on a broad 
interpretation of comparative law as such. Besides primary comparative studies, in which at least two legal 
orders or provisions are compared, those studies are also regarded as part of comparative law that focus only on 
a given legal order or a legal culture – case studies –, but were prepared in a seemingly comparative context. In 
addition, methodological and conceptual contributions are also considered as components of comparative law. In 
sum, for this paper, comparative law is a tradition of legal scholarship with its own broadening scope and 
research interests, thus it is not limited to comparative studies in legal issues in the strictest sense. For an 
overview of the contemporary domains and trends of comparative law see: M Siems, Comparative Law 
(Cambridge, Cambrdige University Press, 2014); J Husa, A New Introduction to Comparative Law (Hart, Oxford 
and Portland, Oregon, 2015). 
2
 For some examples of these initiatives see: D Nelken (ed), Comparing Legal Cultures (Aldershot, Routledge, 
1997); P Legrand, Le droit comparé (Paris, PUF, 2014); M Kurkchiyan, ‘Comparing Legal Cultures: Three 
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glance, in many cases, the use of legal culture seems to be similar to those magical potions of 
fairy tales that can help solve even the greatest difficulties, it defends against the fiery breath 
of a dragon and recovers the forgotten memories of the princess. Reading chapters and articles 
that rely on the concept of legal culture when discussing a topic in a comparative way the 
reader may have exactly the same impression: by invoking legal culture in the discussion 
seemingly complex scholarly problems are immediately solved, for instance, a reference to 
the cultural embeddedness of a legal rule may explain even the most complicated research 
question (or may it). As the main thesis, this paper submits that only a methodologically 
disciplined and conscious – thereby limited and restricted – application of legal culture has a 
high level of scholarly value in comparative law. Otherwise, legal culture may easily become 
nothing more than a tool of conceptual confusion. However, as a preliminary step, before 
going into the details, two points have to be discussed, as they are both essential prerequisites 
for the later discussion. 
 
1. Legal culture is not a contemporary invention 
 
Many of today’s scholars consider the use of legal culture as a contemporary conceptual 
innovation.
3
 When describing this concept in more detail, they usually refer to the work of 
Lawrence M. Friedman, the author of the classic The Legal System. A Social Science 
Perspective published in 1975.
4
 Indeed, this book can definitely be regarded as a symbolical 
starting point of the contemporary inclusion of the concept legal culture into legal scholarship. 
But, from the perspective of the history of ideas, it cannot be said that the use of legal culture 
in legal studies has begun with the oeuvre of Friedman. This has even been recognized 
indirectly by Friedman himself, when he mentioned the relationship between political culture 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Models of Court for Small Civil Cases (2010) 5 Journal of Comparative Law 169-193; Cs Varga, ‘Comparative 
Legal Cultures? Renewal by Transforming into a Genuine Discipline’ (2007) 48 Acta Juridica Hungarica 95-
113. 
3
 See for example: JØ Sunde, ‘Live and Let Die. An Essay Concerning Legal-Cultural Understanding’ in M 
Adams, D Heirbaut (eds), The Method and Culture of Comparative Law (Hart, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 
2014) 221–234; Cs. Varga, ‘Comparative Legal Cultures: Attempts at Conceptualization’ (1997) 38 Acta 
Juridica Hungarica 54. 
4
 L Friedman, The Legal System. A Social Science Perspective (New York, Russel Sage, 1975). For an 
authoritative reference to Friedman’s role in the introduction of the concept of legal culture into socio-legal 
studies see SS Silbey, ‘Legal Culture and Legal Consciousness’ in James Wright (ed) International 
Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Elsevier, 2001) 8624-8625. 
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and legal culture, and also referred to the anthropological understanding of law as a cultural 
phenomenon.
5
 That is, he pointed out that culture had already been applied in some 
neighboring fields of study similarly to his approach. Therefore, Friedman had never claimed 
scholarly novelty for his concept of legal culture, but his readers and followers have tended to 
consider his conceptual innovation as a completely new development in contemporary legal 
scholarship. 
However, without going into the very details of history of ideas in modern legal 
scholarship, it is enough to recall that the application of the concept of culture in legal studies 
had already had a “golden-age” in the first decades of the 20th century. In the German legal 
scholarship of the turn of the 19-20
th
 century, under the influence of both Hegelian and Neo-
Kantian philosophical thinking, the application of the term of legal culture as a key conceptual 
tool was coined by such important authors as Jozef Kohler or Gustav Radbruch.
6
 While 
Kohler determined certain basic convictions on justice and fairness (Rechtspostulate) 
providing a cultural basis for law as such,
7
 Radbruch came up with the concept of Rechtstypus 
synthetizing the fundamental features of a group of legal systems belonging to a given 
Kulturkreis.
8
 That is, law was regarded as an essentially culturally grounded phenomenon by 
both of them. Needless to say, these attempts of a cultural understanding of law were deeply 
rooted in the previous, century-long tradition of German Romanticism that put the uniqueness 
of a people and the problem of difference into the focus of philosophical thinking thereby 
challenging the universalism of earlier Rationalist thinking.
9
 In sum, the recent flourishing of 
legal culture in comparative legal studies has not been without antecedents, they can mostly 
be found in the turn of the 19-20
th
 century German legal scholarship and its philosophical 
basis: Romanticism. 
 
2. The opposition between a functionalist and a cultural approach of comparative law is 
relative 
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 Friedman (n 4) 15. footnote 33. 
6
 For a detailed study see Z Péteri, ‘A jogi kultúrák összehasonlításának előtörténetéhez’ (2007) 48 Állam- és 
Jogtudomány 509-526. 
7
 See J. Kohler, Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie (Lothar Gruber, Lepzig-Berlin, 1909) cited by Péteri (n 6) 515-
519. 
8
 See G. Radbruch, ‘Über die Methode der Rechtsvergleichung’ [1905-1906] in K Zweigert, HJ Puttfarken (eds), 
Rechtsvergleichung (WBG, Darmstadt, 1978) cited by Péteri (n 6) 521. 
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 Cf. JQ Withman, ‘The Neo-Romantic Turn’ in P Legrand, R Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies. 




Today’s comparative law scholarly community seems to be divided along the axis of 
functionalism and culturalism. This opposition has been exposed by most of the latest 




 put a serious emphasis on this division when 
mapping the recent methodological landscape of comparative law. Pierre Legrand still 
advocates the superiority of the cultural understanding of legal comparison
12
 over the 
previous, in his words, “reigning orthodoxy” inspired by the functionalist tenets based on the 
“desire for sameness”.13 By and large, in the recent methodological discourse, boosted 
dominantly by ‘culturalist’ or ‘post-modern’, the functionalist approach of comparative law – 
defined by such authors as Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz14 or Rudolf Schlesinger15 – has 
been regarded as an orthodox one, a remnant of the positivist and lego-centric methodological 
past.
16
 On the contrary, culturalism – based on the claims of grounding comparative law in 
post-modern philosophy, thereby including tolerance, empathy and difference into the 
conceptual framework – is presented as the obvious and only way of conceptual progression. 
These critical remarks centered on the apparent deficiencies of the functionalist approach all 
seem to be relevant, indeed, but another point should also be taken into account. Cultural 
comparative law has emerged as the well-founded critique of ʻclassic’ authors, but the 
reconciliation of these critical remarks with the ‘classic’ methodological toolkit also looks to 
be possible. It has already been proved by Jaakko Husa in his articles when arguing for a 
‘moderate’ version of functionalism setting aside the presumption of similarity (praesumptio 
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 Siems (n 1) 98-118 (discussing the criticism of ‘traditional comparative law’ under the umbrella term of 
‘postmodern comparative law) and 119 (pointing out that the inclusion of the concept of legal culture into 
comparative legal studies may be regarded as a way to renew the earlier formal understanding). 
11
 G Samuel, An Introduction to Comparative Law Theory and Method (Hart, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 
2014) 108-120 (presenting the approach of Pierre Legrand as a scheme of intelligibility – the hermeneutical 
method – trying to contrast the tenets of functionalism). 
12
 For a detailed summary of this approach see P Legrand, ‘The Same and the Different’ in P Legrand, R 
Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies. Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2003) 240-311. 
13
 Legrand (n 12) 245-244. 
14
 See K Zweigert, H Kötz, An introduction to Comparative Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) 32-47. 
15
 See RB Schlesinger, ‘The Common Core of Legal Systems. An Emerging Subject of Comparative Study’ in K 
Nadelmann et al (eds.), Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel E. Yntema (A.W. Sythoff, Leiden, 1961) 65-73. 
16
 For a classic account of post-modern criticism of functionalist comparative law see the seminal article of 
Günther Frankenberg. G. Frankenberg, ‘Critical-Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law’ (1985) 26 





 or defending the concept of legal families as useful ‘launch vehicles’ – a 
conceptual-theoretical tool – for future research.18  
That said, it might be more proper to look at the various competing methods in legal 
comparison as a complex toolkit whose items should always be adapted to the nature of the 
given research question, should it be either a micro- or a macro comparison.
19
 One may even 
argue that these two main methodological lines of thought are supplementary to each other as 
their ‘integrated’ or ‘cooperative’ uses may enable the researcher to get a more refined and 
balanced view of the problem studied as compared to the single-focused approaches. 
Therefore, the harsh opposition between culturalism and functionalism, as it is emphasized by 
the ‘cultural’ scholars of comparative law, may be replaced by a holistic view that may be 
able to find a proper place for each different methodological approach with respect to a given 
research subject during the research process. 
 
II. Three predominant understandings of legal culture in comparative law 
 
Having presented these preliminary points the first part of this paper will focus on the 
concept of legal culture as it is applied in contemporary comparative law dominantly. As legal 
culture is broadly used in contemporary comparative legal studies and, in many cases, in 
rather divergent ways, the existence of a generally shared understanding cannot be presumed. 
Therefore, the definition and delimitation of the main patterns of the interpretations of legal 
culture in comparative law is an indispensable step. In this paper, three patterns will be 
specified in detail; however, this does not at all mean that others do not exist.
20
 This paper 
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 Cf J Husa, ‘Farewell to Functionalism or Methodological Tolerance?’ (2004) 67 Rabels Zeitschrift 419–447. 
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 For this novel approach of the methodological dilemmas inherent in comparative law see M Van Hoecke, ‘The 
Methodology of Comparative Legal Research’ (2015) 5 Law and Method 1-35 or Samuel (n 11). 
20
 For a different account on the application of legal culture in comparative research see D. Nelken, 
‘Comparative Legal Research and Legal Culture: Facts, Approaches and Values’ (2016) 12 Annual Review of 
Social Sciences 45-62. (David Nelken argues that legal culture can be interpreted from the three qualitatively 
different perspectives. First, it may represent various mental, behavioral or factual patterns around the law 
(facts); second, alternatively, this term may also imply an approach looking beyond the conventional rule- and 
institutional focused legal inquiry (approaches); and, third, it may even become a basis for normative statements 
on the law (values).) 
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only tries to group the most typical ones that may be encountered when studying the recent 
scholarly discussion. 
 
1. Legal culture as background of law 
 
A typical reference to legal culture is aimed at pointing out a certain constellation of extra-
legal factors that may have a decisive – or at least: a considerable – influence on law as such 
or on a given legal institution or provision. These factors may come from manifold fields of 
study, mostly depending on either the social science background of the scholar or the nature 
of the problem analyzed. By these references to this set of extra-legal factors as forming the 
cultural background of law or a legal provision the research strives for a comprehensive, so to 
say, holistic approach overstepping the pure, rule-oriented positivistic view of law. In essence, 
by abstracting a cultural context for a legal phenomenon and applying it in the formulation of 
the research insights a legal research design can acquire a much broader scholarly scope and 
this choice may seriously contribute to the scholarly value of the findings. Typically, 
references to or mentioning of legal culture imply the inclusion of sociological, historical, 
political, socio-psychological or cultural studies research findings in legal research. 
This approach can be illustrated properly by referring to Pierre Legrand’s various articles. 
In essence, Legrand urges comparative legal studies to respect difference among legal orders 
instead of seeking the common and uniform points and, therefore, advocates the study of the 
so-called mentalités juridques backing the instrumental components of a legal order.21 
Legrand argues that these mentalités juridiques, having a decisive impact on the functioning 
of legal orders, may only be accessed through an interdisciplinary study based on findings of 
social psychology, linguistic and cultural studies among others.
22
 The in-depth study of 
European legal mentalities – those of continental and Common law – through 
interdisciplinary lenses led Legrand to both insightful and provocative conclusions, such as 
the impossibility of a unified European civil code
23
 and the denial of a real convergence 
between continental law and Common Law.
24
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 P. Legrand, ‘The European Legal Systems are not Converging’ (1996) 45 The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 56-61. 
22
 For details see P Legrand, ‘How to Compare Now’ (1996) 16 Legal Studies 232-242, spec. 236-238. 
23
 P Legrand, ‘Against a European Civil Code’ (1997) 60 The Modern Law Review 44-63. 
24
 Cf. Legrand (n 21). 
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In sum, the concept of legal culture is widely used in order to provide a context for the 
comparative legal research.
25
 This approach has manifold ways, from in-depth case studies to 
broad comparisons of various legal orders, but the fact that legal culture is used to 
contextualize a legal research is a common point. Moreover, attempts for this way of 
contextualization, without mentioning the term legal culture, was already made by the 
classics, too. For instance, René David argued that ideology on the social role of law had a 
crucial role in the formation of legal families,
26
 while Zweigert also put on much emphasis on 
ideological factors and the role of history when elaborating his theory of the style of legal 
families (rechtkreise).
27
 That is, a broader or narrower, contextual understanding of law has 
always been a part of the methodology of modern comparative law, however, this approach 
has become rather popular in comparative legal studies during the last two decades – partly 
due to the proliferation of the references to legal culture. 
 
2. Legal culture as interactions around law 
 
Alternatively, legal culture may also be conceived of as a dynamic understanding of law in 
place of the static, black-letter rule or norm focused approach. While positivist or descriptive 
legal studies can only analyze legal rules and their very details, the findings of legal 
sociology, legal anthropology and cultural studies may help in understanding the interactions 
with respect the usual functioning of legal order. Evidently, these interactions may occur 
either at the macro-level, where different social and political forces compete and interact to 
determine the actual setup of the legal order, or at the micro-level animated by the everyday 
interactions of the citizens having a legal purpose.
28
 The analysis of these interactions may 
even help in the comprehension how the ordinary meaning of law is construed by both macro 
and micro level interactions, that is, how the normative universe around law – nomos29 – 
evolves by the everyday practice of normative commitments. Thereby, this way of study may 
                                                          
25
 For further examples of this approach see: V Gessner, A Hoeland, Cs Varga (eds.): European Legal Cultures 
(Dartmouth, Aldershot et al., 1996). 
26
 R. David, Traité élémentaire de droit comparé (LGDJ, Paris, 1950) 223. 
27
 Cf. Zweigert, Kötz (n 14) 63-73. 
28
 Kurkchiyan (n 2) 170. 
29
 For details see R Cover, ‘The Supreme Court, 1982 Term – Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’ (1983-1984) 97 
Harvard Law Review 4-19. 
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help to reveal how culture, as a social practice,
30
 is capable of influencing the everyday 
perception of law.  
From the various insights of legal anthropology the concept of Semi-Autonomous Social 
Fields offers a valuable contribution to conceptualizing this complex and many times 
contradictory process as for the micro-level of these interactions. Some studies have already 
tried to use this approach in a comparative way to get a better picture of a given legal 
question.
31
 This term was coined by Sally Falk Moore at the end of the seventies.
32
 Moore 
started from the conceptual framework of classical anthropological thinking and passionately 
argued that “law and social context could not be separated”. As a further step, she also relied 
on the comparative lessons of two case studies: the dress industry in New York and the 
Chagga tribe of Mount Kilimanjaro where she carried out the field work personally.
33
 
Essentially, from this anthropological perspective, modern societies are about the endless 
                                                          
30
 For the various methodological approaches of culture see: JW Mohr, CM Rawlings, ‘Formal Models of 
Culture’ in JR Hall, L Grindstaff, M-C Lo (eds.), Handbook of Cultural Sociology (Routledge, London, New 
York 2010) 119-129. From the aspect of the history of ideas see: AL Kroeber, C Kluckhohn, Culture. A Critical 
Review of Concepts and Definitions (Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology, Cambridge, 
Mass, 1952). 
31
 For example: PS Berman, ‘Towards a Jurisprudence of Hybridity’ (2010) 11 Utah Law Review 11-29, spec. 
20-24. M Hertogh, ‘Crime and Custom in the Dutch Construction Industry’ (2010) 4 Legisprudence 307-326; F 
Shariff, ‘Power Relations and Legal Pluralism. An Examination of ‘Strategies of Struggles’ Amongst the Santal 
Adivasi of Indian and Bangladesh’ (2008) 57 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1-43;  
32
 SF Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study’ 
(1973) 7 Law and Society Review 719-746. For an excellent contemporary discussion of this concept in the 
broader context of the social effects of legal norms see: J Griffiths, ‘The Social Working of Legal Rules’ (2003) 
48 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1-84. 
33
 Based on this comparative study, as a general point, Moore argued that the SASFs are to be regarded as the 
fundamental units of social control instead of official state law even if the latter has the obvious monopoly of use 
of force. That is, society is comprised of many social fields being able to apply effective coercion or inducement 
that can motivate the behavior of their members. Basically, in Moore’s eyes, SASFs “bring forth and maintain 
behavioral rules”, (Griffiths (n 32) 23) thus they successfully exercise social control over a specific segment of 
society. It is also important that the boundaries of SASFs – that is their scope of influence – are not to be defined 
by their organizations but by the “fact that (they) can generate rules and coerce and induce compliance to them”. 
(Moore (n 32) 722; Griffiths (n 32) 24) Therefore, the decisive element is the ability of exercising social control 
even if it is limited or solely particular; the degree of social formalization is simply irrelevant. At the same time, 
SASFs are only partially autonomous, because the members of a given SASF may also be members of other 




normative interactions of these semi-autonomous units of organization. Thereby people’s 
decisions are always influenced by the competition of divergent normative claims emanating 
from various SASFs. In addition, owing to this regulative potential they are also able to resist, 
at least partially, external pressures, i.e. state law, or claims set forth by other SASFs.
34
 
A well-known model of macro-level interactions around the law was already established 
by Lawrence M. Friedman. In his path-breaking volume that, among others, revitalized the 
use of legal culture in Western legal scholarship, he described the ‘legal system’ as the 
continuous interaction of structure, substance and culture.
35
 In this concept structure meant 
the institutional setting, while substance referred to the legal provisions coordinating the 
behavior of both citizens and institutions.
36
 The third component, culture was an umbrella 
term by Friedman as it summarized all these non-legal effects – social forces in the broadest 
sense – that were able to give “life and reality”37 to the legal order. A special segment of these 
outside social influences on law was legal culture as its function was to convert these external 
effects to relevant demands for the legal sphere being composed of structure and substance.
38
 
That is, macro-level interactions around law – including political, social and other forces – 
should always amend the formal picture of the law if one wants to get a realistic picture; and 
culture and legal culture may have a crucial role in their analysis and study. 
If the analyzed interactions – should they be micro- or macro-level ones – are delimited 
precisely in a research project – as for instance based on social regulatory units or on a given 
legal body – they can be studied in comparative projects.39 Obviously, these kind of 
comparative studies, interested in how interactions shape the perception of law in different 
contexts, do not necessarily refer to their precise methodological bases, but their intent to 
compare interactions of social, political or everyday life when construing a meaning of law 
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 Griffiths (n 32) 26. 
35
 Friedman (n 4) 16. 
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 Friedman (n 4) 14. 
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 Friedman (n 4) 15. 
38
 Friedman (n 4) 15-16. 
39
 See for example A Sajó, ‘Pluralism in Post-Communist Law’ (2003) 44 Acta Juridica Hungarica 1-20. For the 
presentation of the main comparative themes of legal anthropology, see: FG Snyder, ‘Anthropology, Dispute 
Processes and Law. A Critical Introduction’ (1981) 8 British Journal of Law and Society 140-180, spec. 144-
151. For a recent summary of this way of studies, see: F Pirie, ‘Comparison in the Anthropology and History of 
Law’ (2014) 9 Journal of Comparative Law 88-107. 
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and thereby creating normative commitments connect them to this way of analysis.
40
 In sum, 
these studies may reveal important insights into the socio-cultural embeddedness of law from 
a comparative aspect. Therefore, they also point out the cultural determination of law even 
without explicitly invoking legal culture as a conceptual term in many cases. 
 
3. Legal culture as a sum of attitudes towards law 
 
The attitudinal interpretation of legal culture is also rooted in Lawrence M. Friedman’s 
conception of legal culture. In essence – as it was already mentioned – he interpreted legal 
culture as medium of conversion being able to transform various interests, generated by 
diverse social forces, into relevant demands toward the legal system as such.
41
 That is to say, 
the function of legal culture in Friedman’s interpretation is the maintenance of the continuous 
conversion process between the colorful social reality composed of regulatory claims and 
demands and the legal system. As for the components of legal culture, Friedman points out 
that “it refers to public knowledge of and attitudes and behavior patterns toward the legal 
system”.42 Thereafter, he highlights that these attitudes and patterns toward law may differ 
from group to group, from country to country meaning that many different levels of 
abstraction of legal culture can be identified according to the intentions of the researchers.
43
 
For him, the most relevant one from these different layers of legal culture is the differentiation 
between the so-called internal one – the legal culture of the professionals – and the external 
one – the legal culture of the population. Further, from a historical perspective, he also 
convincingly argues for the uniqueness of modern legal culture as a socio-cultural entity.
44
 
That is, in this sense, legal culture may even be conceived of as a historical concept, too, 
besides its socio-legal meanings. 
It is needless to explain why this understanding of legal culture stimulates comparative law 
scholarship. It makes it possible to integrate insights of sociology of law on the role of social 
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 To illustrate this in a post-socialist context see these two excellent case studies: M. Marek, ‘Informal Networks 
and Interstitial Arenas of Power in the Making of Civil Society Law in Serbia’ (2015) 57 Sociologija 571-592; 
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and group attitudes towards law into the research design of a comparative law research 
project. Therefore, comparative research becomes capable of penetrating into the social 
context of law by applying the statistical methods of sociology of law. This implies that by 
integrating these statistical methods the rather fuzzy and blurred social context of law can be 
translated into the ‘language of numbers’ that seems to be capable of enhancing the scholarly 
value of these studies on the market of legal studies. That is, if the applied concept of legal 
culture is defined properly in a research, the use of these methods may be able to establish a 
handy framework for comparing two or more legal orders and their social context – mostly 
based on ‘numbers’ provided by the statistical analysis. 
Among many excellent publications, a good example of this kind of comparative research 
is the well-known article of James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira which identifies 
various patterns of European legal cultures by cross-country comparing survey data on 
attitudes toward law from the thirteen members of the European Union in 1993.
45
 This 
research was based on data from a Eurobarometer omnibus survey and individual, country-
specific interviews putting into their focus three legal values – rule of law, neutrality of law, 
and individual liberty. It analyzed the survey data by statistical methods and pointed out the 
existence of three different attitude sets – a rule of law respecting one, a more skeptical one 
and mix of these two poles – on the level of mass opinion on law in Western Europe.46 
Moreover, Gibson and Caldeira also argued that the European attitudes toward law can be 
described by a factor based on three factor items being in correlation with the three legal 
values defined at the very beginning of the research.
47
 All in all, the comparative analysis of 
mass attitudes towards law has already proved to be a successful and inspiring subfield of 
comparative law as it enabled comparativists to integrate numerous methods of legal 
sociology into the tools of legal comparison, or, conversely, it inspired legal sociologist to 
rely on a more intensive application of comparative methods.
48
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III. Three typical inconsistencies in the application of legal culture in comparative law 
 
Thus far, three dominant uses of legal culture in comparative legal studies have been 
described. In the following, this paper gives an overview of certain typical scholarly 
mistreatments of legal culture that also characterizes the contemporary use of this term in 
comparative law. These ways of inconsistent application will be defined in their typical forms, 
then examples will also be discussed in order to have a closer look at the problems implied. 
However, it must be stressed at this point, that this paper does never claim that a given author 
goes wrong in his or her article, but it only argues that the application of legal culture in his or 
her argumentation might be questioned or criticized from a conceptual or a methodological 
aspect. This capacity of methodological criticism seems to be inherent in the use of legal 
culture as it has never had a well-defined and consensually shared working definition, but 




1. Inconsistency One: confusion of different understandings in the same study 
 
A typical and perhaps the most emblematic form of the inconsistent use of the concept of 
legal culture is grounding the scholarly argumentation in – slightly or heavily – different 
understandings of legal culture in the same paper. For example, an author may start with the 
application of the holistic approach pointing out the role of extra-legal factors in the modern 
development of a legal provision, and – a few pages later – he or she may try to broaden the 
methodological scope towards the discussion of certain attitudes, as they are expressed in 
statistical data, under the label of cultural factors. The main problem with this mistreatment is 
that it implies the parallel application of different methodological toolkits. In our hypothetical 
case: an interdisciplinary, multi-focused approach of the socio-historical background and 
another one from the sociology of law that relies heavily on statistical analysis. As these 
methods are partially incompatible or at least incommensurable by their very nature, as they 
are rooted in different academic traditions, the scholarly value of this mixing solution may 
have rather questionable results. Further, due to the incompatibility of these methods, this 
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inconsistency often leads to conceptual and terminological confusion. That is, this kind of 
inconsistent application of legal culture in a research design may seriously weaken the 
scholarly appropriateness of an otherwise well-established research from a narrow, but 
relevant a methodological aspect.  
A good example of this conceptual inconsistency may be found in an otherwise very 
inspiring article devoted to casting light on the recent tendencies of internationalization in 
Norwegian law. Although the analysis is aimed at one legal order, Norwegian law, the 
comparative nature of the study cannot be denied as the internationalization of legal orders, as 
a general legal phenomenon, has already become a sui generis issue in comparative legal 
studies.
50
 The discussion starts with making a distinction between legal culture as a 
phenomenon in its own right and as an instrument of legal analysis.
51
 In general, the author 
broadly defines legal culture as a “social phenomenon”, and, in addition, he also argues that 
law is a product of legal culture.
52
 Due to these general introductory remarks on the social 
embeddedness of law one may suppose that the article subscribes to the holistic understanding 
of legal culture, as a methodological starting point. That is, the appearance of certain extra-
legal factors is expected that may explain, to various extents, the internationalization of 
Norwegian law. However, a few pages later the article makes a turn in a methodological sense 
as it points out that the approach of van Hoecke and Warrington
53
 is to be followed. This 
identifies legal culture as “ideas and expectations of law made operational by institutional and 
institutional-like practices.”54 As a closing methodological point, the author enlists six criteria 
that may be able to provide a basis for legal cultural analysis: “(1) conflict resolution, (2) 
norm production, (3) idea of justice, (4) legal method, (5) professionalization, and (6) 
internationalization”.55 
At this point, the inconsistent application becomes apparent immediately. It can be argued, 
that although a holistic understanding of legal culture was defined as a starting point, the 
author slides partially to a dynamic, interaction-oriented interpretation of legal culture since 
the functioning of law – conflict resolution and norm production in the list above – as such is 
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mentioned when defining the conceptual basis for the research as a decisive point. Needless to 
say, both conflict resolution and norm production are situated in the focus of either micro- or 
macro level interactions. Therefore, their study needs such research tools that manifestly 
differ from those if legal culture is applied as a background for the discussion. Unsurprisingly, 
the author’s conclusion may be regarded as fairly narrow as he advocates a “practical 
approach to legal culture” instead of becoming a real insider of a given legal culture.56 
Moreover, no explication is offered of the practical implications of this turn. In fact, by the 
emphasis on the “practical approach to legal culture” the article indirectly acknowledges the 
problems of applying such a concept of legal culture that may embrace practically everything 
that is in any way relevant to a given research. 
 
2. Inconsistency Two: under-theorization of legal culture 
 
A major threat for the application of legal culture is definitely the problem of 
oversimplification. Some of the authors are willing to apply this term without any real 
scholarly reflection, that is, they do not ground their arguments as for the cultural 
embeddedness of law in a solid methodological framework. Bearing in mind the various 
diverging meanings of legal culture, the problems of this mistreatment become apparent at the 
very beginning as without a well-founded approach the term of legal culture will easily lose 
its explanatory value. Therefore, it can be regarded as a nice ornament in the text, but not a 
real scholarly concept that contributes to the understanding of a given problem. In most of 
these cases the authors simply mention legal culture as the background of the studied 
question, or they solely refer to the cultural embeddedness of a legal rule, but they do so 
without either any serious methodological consideration or explanation. In these cases the use 
of legal culture serves no other purpose than to enrich the text of an article with a resonant 
scholarly buzzword that should connect a paper to this fashionable discourse. In sum, even 
simple references to legal culture may make a scholarly paper more attractive in the eyes of 
both readers and reviewers. 
For instance, a recent paper on the cultural limits of the recent developments of European 
private law may illustrate well the nature of this kind of inconsistency when referring to legal 
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 This otherwise well-written and rather fascinating article pays noticeably less 
attention to the concept of legal culture even though this term is mentioned in its title twice. 
On the contrary, the concept of culture is treated quite broadly by relying on the work of 
many relevant authors. However, neither the relationship between general culture and legal 
culture, nor the specificities of legal culture are discussed. Solely the threefold concept of 
Karlo Tuori – according to which legal culture is composed of three layers: surface level, 
middle level and deep level – is mentioned specifically as for legal culture, and, in addition, 
the author also invokes Duncan Kennedy’s point putting serious emphasis on the relevance of 
identity discourse in the functioning of law.
58
 Unfortunately, the article does not endeavor to 
create an applicable working concept of legal culture although in the discussion of the recent 
developments of European private law under aegis of the European Union’s harmonization 
efforts the variety of cultural settings and the lack of a common European culture may get an 
important place.
59
 In sum, this article may illustrate well that the creation of an applicable 
working concept of legal culture, as a first step in a research design, is unavoidable in case 
one intends to use this term as a real scholarly concept rather than a simple textual decoration. 
 
3. Inconsistency Three: over-theorization of legal culture 
 
Another danger in the application of legal culture when scholars – keeping in mind the 
utmost complexity of the phenomenon – try to create such a complex working concept of 
legal culture that clearly overtheorizes it. This problem means that those who intend to apply 
legal culture in their studies merge too many kinds of specific knowledge into this single 
term. Indeed, this inconsistency is very understandable and it also suggests that the authors 
have understood the conceptual weaknesses of legal culture and the various methodological 
consequences, but, unfortunately, the answers given are inadequate to these dilemmas. These 
dilemmas as for the application of legal culture are illustrated well by a point of van Hoecke 
and Warrington in their seminal article discussing the perspectives of comparative law at the 
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 century. They argue that “law is not just a set of rules or concepts, neither is it an 
isolated social practice. Law and legal practice are one aspect of the culture to which they 
belong. ‘Legal cultures’ are part of more general cultures.”60 Basically, they reveal that law 
cannot hardly be studied in the conventional rule-focused way nowadays but the socio-
cultural contexts should also play a considerable role. However, if an approach centered on 
the cultural embeddedness of law is applied, than this choice obviously gives rise to very 
complex methodological problems. The way out from these methodological challenges may 
be the intensive use of various interdisciplinary approaches as they may enable the scholar to 
handle this socio-cultural complexity. 
As a second step, van Hoecke and Warrington, in order to establish a concept of legal 
culture that is capable of meeting the requirements of the above mentioned cultural 
complexity behind law, list six different aspects of legal culture. This also implies that, in 
their eyes, legal culture should be understood as a synthesis of these six layers. 
These are as follows: (1) the concept of law; (2) a theory of valid legal sources including 
both the structural and dynamic aspects; (3) a methodology of law focusing on the 
interpretation of law and the internal relationships within adjudication; (4) a theory of 
argumentation with special regard to extra-legal components; (5) a theory of legitimation with 
respect to formal, historical, axiological and sociological dimensions; and (6) a common basic 
ideology.
61
 It must also be mentioned that this approach of legal culture is specifically 
devoted to the lawyers’ legal culture,62 so it is focused on such points of legal culture that 
appears to be relevant from the legal aspect. In sum, van Hoecke and Warrington envisage the 
concept of legal culture in comparative law as a general, so to say umbrella, concept that is 
able to incorporate such ‘soft’ elements of the legal world that frequently remain invisible for 
conventional, rule-oriented legal research. 
Although the comprehensive nature of this list prepared by these two authors is certainly a 
clear advantage, it may also be argued that – from the aspect of the operationalization of legal 
research – it implies some difficulties, too. These difficulties result from the overtly over-
excessive nature of this conceptualization of legal culture. Having analyzed these six elements 
one may conclude that they bring together, among other things, approaches from the 
following fields of study: legal theory, theory of adjudication, rhetoric, sociology of law, 
general and legal history, political science, political philosophy, sociology and cultural 
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studies. Thus, a very – perhaps too – broad spectrum of different scholarly approaches is 
behind this impressive intellectual attempt to articulate a proper concept of legal culture for 
comparative law. However, realistically speaking, no conventional research plan can be 
realized with help of this concept as it would need the high level application of so many fields 
of legal and cultural studies that makes it unsuitable for normal research activities. 
Alternatively, only extremely artificial and highly abstract points may be argued if starting 
with this concept. This danger is clearly seen by the authors, too, as they suggest using 
various, but not all, elements from this list for either macro- or micro-level comparison 
depending on the scope of the given study.
63
 Thus, as the scope of a research project requires 
the framework of the comparative study can be built up with the help of some elements of this 
concept of legal culture.  
All in all, van Hoecke and Warrington made an impressive attempt to conceptualize legal 
culture in a comprehensive way, but their construction in its entirety may not be well suited 
for conventional research due to its extremely complex interdisciplinary nature. Its real value 
may be that it reveals all the main components of legal culture as an ideal type – Idealtypus – 
and it facilitates the future researchers’ task when selecting a given or some aspects of legal 
culture for a comparative study. This criticism, indeed, does not undermine the scholarly 
value of the fascinating study of van Hoecke and Warrington as they also realized this 
problem indirectly when separating the various elements for micro- or macro comparison, but 
it helps us understand the inherent limits of this inspiring concept. 
 
IV. Methodological lessons 
 
The different uses and the inconsistencies uncovered as for the application of legal culture 
in comparative legal studies should not be surprising. On the contrary, their appearance is 
almost natural in the case of such a complex and blurred term. As long as a commonly shared 
scholarly definition of legal culture is lacking in comparative law there is no hope to develop 
a concise, thoughtful and standardized application. However, this does not at all mean that 
certain methodological considerations cannot be formulated that may be able to support and 
improve the use of this term in legal comparison. As, it can hardly be denied, comparative law 
needs those new insights and inspirations that are embedded in the term of legal culture. 
Without legal culture comparative law would never address those new challenges that 
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emanate from both the general transformation of legal scholarship started from the seventies 
and accelerated in the last two decades
64
 and the emergence of a new, globalized and 
interdependent legal world. 
Thus, having discussed the different uses of legal culture in comparative law and some 
inconsistencies, three main lessons have to be specified. 
1. Expecting too much from the application of legal culture in a legal research project with 
a comparative scope is not advisable; it is obvious that this concept is unable to back all kind 
of research plans. Simply, the concept of legal culture has its specific history within the 
broader history of legal scholarship, therefore, its scope of application is limited by the very 
nature of things, dominantly to sociological, anthropological and contextual problems. It has 
to be accepted that many research questions exist that cannot be properly explained by the use 
of legal culture even though a reference to legal culture would link the research to a rather 
fashionable discourse. 
2. It should never have been forgotten that legal culture, and cultural studies in 
comparative law in general, is just one possible method from the so-called methodological 
toolbox of comparative law.
65
 Many other methods exist – for instance: functional, analytical 
or historical – that many also provide the researcher with efficient research tools for carrying 
out well-founded comparative law research. That is, the invocation of legal culture in a 
comparative project cannot be considered as a general methodological solution, but its 
application has to be chosen decisively with respect to the research question and the 
disciplinary background of the researcher or the research team. 
3. Lastly, if the application of legal culture is justified in a comparative study, the 
researcher must always chose a proper approach of legal culture and all the potential 
methodological consequences of this choice must be taken into account. The differentiation 
among the approaches of legal culture as background, as interactions around law, or as a sum 
of attitudes towards law may help as it delineates three typical and frequent use of legal 
culture, but other approaches may also be identified as Nelken pointed out it. If this choice 
has been made the researcher should try to remain within the conceptual borders of his or her 
understanding as much as possible in the project. 
In conclusion, a much more self-reflective methodological and critical application of legal 
culture seems to be needed in comparative legal studies in order to find the proper place for 
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this term in the structure of the emerging post-functionalist comparative law. Obviously, this 
challenge cannot be met overnight, but methodological reflection may help in paving the way 
toward a future solution. 
